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The laws of God, the laws of man,
He may keep that will and can;
Not I:  let God and man decree
Laws for themselves and not for me;
And if my ways are not as theirs
Let them mind their own affairs.
Their deeds I judge and much condemn,
Yet when did I make laws for them?
Please yourselves, say I, and they
Need only look the other way.
But no, they will not; they must still
Wrest their neighbour to their will,
And make me dance as they desire
With jail and gallows and hell-fire.
And how am I to face the odds
Of man’s bedevilment and God’s?1
INTRODUCTION
Christian ideology is deeply embedded in our culture.  Some,
such as former President George W. Bush and those who adhere to
his conception of Christianity, celebrate the marriage of Christian-
ity and the law; however, that union violates a fundamental princi-
ple of American law—that “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion[.]”2  However, because Christianity
has become so instrumental in shaping the law, it is often difficult
to distinguish religious interests from secular interests, or interests
that favor an establishment of religion from those that do not.  The
inability to make such a distinction has rendered permissible both
government funding of faith-based organizations and legally sanc-
tioned discrimination against homosexuals.
1 A.E. Housman, The Laws of God, the Laws of Man, in THE PENGUIN BOOK OF HO-
MOSEXUAL VERSE 238, 238–39 (Stephen Coote ed., 1983).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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The Establishment Clause was, in the words of Jefferson,
meant to “[build] a wall of separation between church and State.”3
The Supreme Court, in its interpretation of the Establishment
Clause, has departed dramatically from this strict separation.  In-
stead, it has developed a series of elementized tests for determin-
ing whether government involvement with religion has run afoul of
the Establishment Clause.  Although this departure is unfortunate,
the author intends to demonstrate that both government funding
of faith-based organizations and legally sanctioned discrimination
against homosexuals violates the Establishment Clause, even in its
weakened state.
Recently, the Supreme Court, in Hein v. Freedom from Religion
Foundation, Inc.,4 has effectively rendered the Establishment Clause
meaningless with respect to actions by the Executive Branch.  The
Court, by denying standing to persons in their capacities as taxpay-
ers, has immunized the Executive Branch from judicial review with
respect to its general expenditures.  In doing so, the Court has
given license to the Executive Branch both to proselytize and to
direct its funds to faith-based groups that discriminate.  Although
the Court has not deemed such actions constitutionally permissible
per se, it has, by denying standing to those who may challenge those
actions, rendered those actions practically permissible.
President Bush, through his Faith-based and Community Initi-
ative (“FBCI”), has demonstrated his perception of the proper role
of faith-based organizations in our society.  However, his vision is
fraught with the possibility that the government, through its fund-
ing of faith-based organizations, will use religion to discriminate
against citizens of the United States.  In fact, such discrimination
has already occurred, and the Supreme Court, in Hein, has ren-
dered that discrimination, at least with respect to the Executive
Branch, permissible.
In the following pages, this Article will present the teachings
of predominant Christian sects with respect to homosexuality, fo-
cusing on Catholicism.  It will then provide a historical survey of
Christianity to demonstrate how Christian teachings with respect to
homosexuality have become embedded in American law.
The Article will then focus on the development and decon-
struction of the Establishment Clause, focusing on what Madison
and Jefferson understood it to mean, the Supreme Court’s differ-
ent interpretations, and the role of religion in government as per-
3 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptists (Jan. 1, 1802).
4 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found. Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2553, 2563 (2007).
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ceived by President Bush as evidenced by his Faith-based and
Community Initiative.
Then, the Article will briefly present the Supreme Court’s
holding in Flast v. Cohen5 to assist in understanding the Supreme
Court’s construction of that holding in Hein, which the Article will
discuss in greater detail.  It will also present recent Establishment
Clause challenges by taxpayers to government funding of faith-
based organizations prior to Hein.  Afterward, the Article will pre-
sent the decision of the Southern District of New York in Lown v.
Salvation Army, Inc.,6 which suggests that such a challenge may be
the only possibility of recourse for persons subjected to discrimina-
tion at the hands of government-funded faith-based organizations.
The Article will then analyze the repercussions of Hein with
respect to the entanglement between the Executive Branch and re-
ligion as well as President Bush’s Faith-based and Community Initi-
ative.  It will proceed to argue that government funding of faith-
based organizations violates the Establishment Clause, that faith-
based organizations use religion to discriminate against homosexu-
als and that the government, by funding those organizations, also
discriminates.  The Article will argue that legally sanctioned dis-
crimination against homosexuals is merely an imposition of Chris-
tian ideology upon the electorate, and as such, violates the
Establishment Clause.  In the course of that discussion, it will
demonstrate that both England’s break with the Catholic Church
and the medical profession have led to a misconstruction of relig-
ious interests as secular and have given secular and scientific clout
to discrimination against homosexuals.
The Article then argues that, pursuant to Hein, the Executive
Branch may, immune from judicial review, use religion to de-
nounce homosexuality or provide funds to faith-based groups that
do so.7  The article will discuss Lown v. Salvation Army, Inc., which
suggests that the Establishment Clause may be the only possibility
for recourse for those who have been subject to discrimination by
government-funded faith-based groups; but that the Supreme
5 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
6 Lown v. Salvation Army, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
7 A caveat:  The author has consciously chosen to use the term “homosexual.”
The term is meant to encompass those who identify as “gay,” “lesbian,” “queer,” “bi-
sexual,” or “transgender.”  The author stresses that this does not in any way demon-
strate a belief on his part that those identities should be excluded from discourse but
merely the reality that religious groups and the law generally do not recognize the
diversity of the queer community.  The author has decided to use the term “homosex-
ual” for consistency and to alleviate confusion; however, when the term is used in his
voice, it is meant to encompass the aforementioned identities.
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Court, in Hein, foreclosed that possibility, at least with respect to
general expenditures by the Executive Branch.
I. CHRISTIANITY AND THE LAW
A. Heterosexual Morality as Christian Ideology:  Homosexuality and
Christianity
The Bible serves as the primary justification for Christians who
discriminate against homosexuals.  The book of Leviticus considers
homosexuality an abomination, warning believers that, “Thou shalt
not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is abomination,”8 and
that “If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both
of them have committed an abomination:  they shall surely be put
to death; their blood shall be upon them.”9  The texts, as well as
modern culture, construe homosexuals as equivalent to sodomites.
The book of Deuteronomy proclaims that, “There shall be no
whore of the daughters of Israel, nor a sodomite of the sons of
Israel.  Thou shalt not bring the hire of a whore, or the price of a
dog, into the house of the Lord thy God for any vow: for even both
these are [an] abomination unto the Lord thy God.”10
Denunciation of homosexuality appears even in the New Tes-
tament, which Christians, especially Catholics, interpret as a sym-
bol of and testament to the love of Christ for his followers.11  The
first book of Corinthians precludes the “effeminate” from inherit-
ing the kingdom of God.12  The Book of Romans describes a
shameful scenario where men “leaving the natural use of the wo-
man, burned in their lust, one towards another; men with men
working that which is unseemly and receiving in themselves the
recompence of their error which was meet.”13
Although the Torah and the Bible do not explicitly denounce
sexual relations between women, proscriptions against same-sex re-
lations have historically been construed throughout Anglo-Euro-
pean law as including both lesbian and gay male identities.14  The




11 See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, 566 §§ 2357–59 (Libreria Editrice Vat-
icana 1994).
12 1 Corinthians 6:9–10.
13 Romans 1:24, 26–27.
14 See Ruthann Robson, Lesbianism in Anglo-European Legal History, 5 WIS. WOMEN’S
L.J. 1 (1990) (refuting the misconception that Anglo-European proscriptions against
homosexuality applied exclusively to men).
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homosexuality a burden akin to a physical or mental handicap.15
Catholics do not deny the pervasive existence of homosexuals, but
direct homosexuals to live a life of celibacy for which they will be
rewarded in the afterlife.16  The Catholic Church condemns not
what it considers the homosexual condition, but rather acts of ho-
mosexuality.  It directs homosexuals to accept the plight that is
their homosexuality and assures homosexuals they will be re-
warded for their abstinence.17
Though the Catechism suggests that discrimination against
homosexuals should be avoided, the Vatican, in 1992, in the wake
of proposed anti-discrimination legislation in Congress issued a
statement warning that anti-discrimination legislation could “en-
courage a person with a homosexual orientation to declare his ho-
mosexuality or even to seek a partner.”18  Though hypocritical, the
statements by the Vatican are relatively humane compared to the
statements by and proposals of members of the religious right—
conservative Christians and Evangelicals.  That same year, the di-
rector of the Coalition on Revival declared that “homosexuality
makes God vomit,”19 while fundamentalists, angered by President
15 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 11.
16 Id.
17 Id.
“Homosexuality refers to relations between men or between women
who experience an exclusive or predominant sexual attraction toward
persons of the same sex.  It has taken a great variety of forms through
the centuries and in different cultures.  Its psychological genesis re-
mains largely unexplained.  Basing itself on Sacred Scripture, which
presents homosexual acts as acts of grave depravity, tradition has always
declared that ‘homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered.’  They are
contrary to the natural law.  They close the sexual act to the gift of life.
They do not proceed from a genuine affective and sexual complemen-
tarity.  Under no circumstances can they be approved.  The number of
men and women who have deep-seated homosexual tendencies is not
negligible.  They do not choose their homosexual condition; for most of
them it is a trial.  They must be accepted with respect, compassion, and
sensitivity.  Every sign of unjust discrimination in their regard should be
avoided.  These persons are called to fulfill God’s will in their lives and,
if they are Christians, to unite to the sacrifice of the Lord’s Cross the
difficulties they may encounter from their condition.  Homosexual per-
sons are called to chastity.  By the virtues of self-mastery that teach them
inner freedom, at times by the support of disinterested friendship, by
prayer and sacramental grace, they can and should gradually and reso-
lutely approach Christian perfection.”
Id.
18 JIM HILL & RAND CHEADLE, THE BIBLE TELLS ME SO: USES AND ABUSES OF HOLY
SCRIPTURE 72 (1996).
19 Id. at 70–71 (quoting The Advocate, Oct. 20, 1992) (the Coalition on Revival calls
for the adoption of the Old Testament as American law).
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Clinton’s “pro-gay stance,” called upon Rev. Billy Graham to break
his tradition of leading the nation in prayer at the President’s
inauguration.20
However, contemporary protest by Christian groups against
homosexuality did not begin with the Clinton Administration.  In
the 1960s, the Roman Catholic Church, in response to the pro-
posed repeal of New York State’s sodomy law, led a campaign that
defeated the proposal.21  When the New York Court of Appeals
eventually invalidated the statute in 1980,22 the Church “urged that
consensual sodomy must remain a crime because:  ‘We must take
every reasonable step to inhibit [homosexuality’s] spread and to
eradicate it.’”23  In 1977, singer Anita Bryant, driven by her Baptist
faith, led a successful campaign to rescind a gay rights ordinance
that had been passed in Dade County, Florida.24  Bryant warned
fellow believers that because homosexuals could not reproduce,
“they must freshen their ranks with our children.”25  In response,
queer advocates plead, “We are your children.”26
The rise of the AIDS crisis among the gay community in the
early 1980s fueled further disdain of homosexuality by the religious
right.  Several representatives of the religious right, including for-
mer U.S. Senator, the late Jesse Helms, and founder of the Chris-
tian coalition and politico, Pat Robertson, called for the
construction of quarantine camps for those suffering with AIDS to
“protect the innocent.”27  In 1983, a spokesman for the Moral Ma-
jority warned that, “If homosexuals are not stopped, they will in
time infect the entire nation, and America will be destroyed.”28
Jerry Falwell, co-founder of the Moral Majority, characterized
homosexuals in 1984, as “brute beasts . . . part of a vile and satanic
20 Id. at 70.
21 See John Sibley, Overhaul Urged for Penal Code, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1964, at 1;
Emanuel Perlmutter, Penal Law Plan Meets Objection, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1964, at 43;
Emanuel Perlmutter, Catholics and Episcopalians Differ on Law for Sex Deviates, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 1964, at 1; R.W. Apple Jr., Revised Penal Code Sent to Legislature, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 1965, at 1; John Sibley, Assembly Passes a Total Revision of the Penal Law,
N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1965, at 1; John Sibley, Governor Signs New Penal Law, N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 1965, at 1.
22 People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476 (1980).
23 See Matthew Thomas Robinson, People v. Onofre: Can the State Peek Into Your
Bedroom?, 2 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 6, 6–7 (1980-1981).
24 See, e.g., DUDLEY CLENDINEN & ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD: THE STRUGGLE
TO BUILD A GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 292 (1999).
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system [that] will be utterly annihilated, and there will be a celebra-
tion in heaven.”29
B. History of Christianity and the Law
Ancient societies, including the Greeks, tolerated and even
condoned homosexuality; Greece was eventually consumed by the
Roman Empire, which was consumed, in turn, by Christianity.30
Christianity’s control over the Roman Empire marks the genesis of
Judeo-Christian entanglement with modern American law.  Roman
Emperor Caesar Flavius Anicius Justinianus (“Justinian”) became
convinced, based on his Christian beliefs, “that the earthquakes,
famine, and pestilence his empire had suffered were the conse-
quence of God’s wrath upon homosexuals.”31  His 77th Novella,
promulgated in A.D. 538, reflects this belief by characterizing lust
between men as disgraceful and as contrary to nature.32  As punish-
ment for violation of the statute, homosexuals were to be “tor-
tured, mutilated, paraded in public, and executed.”33
Justinian’s Code served as a pretext to an even greater hostility
toward homosexuality that arose in the 11th and 12th centuries.
After the dissolution of the Roman Empire, a number of religious
factions arose throughout Europe.34  One of the most prominent
of those factions was the Cathars.35  The Cathars advocated “nonvi-
olence, the end of private property, and ‘spiritual,’ i.e., chaste mar-
riages.”36  The continued growth of the Cathars, especially in
29 Id. at 69–70.
30 C. Ray Cliett, How a Note or a Grope Can Be Justification for the Killing of a Homosex-
ual:  An Analysis of the Effects of the Supreme Court’s Views on Homosexuals, African Ameri-
cans and Women, 29 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 219, 251 (2003).
31 HILL & CHEADLE, supra note 18, at 68.
32 Timothy W. Reinig, Sin, Stigma & Society:  A Critique of Morality and Values in
Democratic Law and Policy, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 859, 870 (1990).
[S]ince certain men, seized by diabolical incitement, practise among
themselves the most disgraceful lusts, and act contrary to nature:  we
enjoin them to take to heart the fear of God and the judgment to come,
and to abstain from suchlike diabolical and unlawful lusts, so that they
may not be visited by the just wrath of God on account of these impious
acts, with the result that cities perish with all their inhabitants.  For we
are taught by the Holy Scriptures that because of like impious conduct
cities have indeed perished, together with the men in them.
Id. The “perish of cities” refers to conventional understanding of the biblical tale of
Sodom and Gomorrah wherein the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah were destroyed by
“brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven,” because their inhabitants had en-
gaged, among a number of other sins, in sodomy.  Genesis 19:24–25.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 872.
35 Id.
36 Id.
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France, eventually drew the attention of the Inquisition.  Oppo-
nents, including the floundering Roman Catholic Church, claimed
that in order to maintain their chaste marriages, the Cathars
sodomized their wives.37  To retain control, Pope Innocent II
launched a crusade of a half million men, who slaughtered the
Cathars throughout Provence.38
The Roman Catholic Church accused a number of sects of
sodomy, incest, bestiality and orgy well into the 14th century.39
Pope Clement V, along with Philip IV of France, in an effort to
seize their treasury, extinguished the Order of the Knights Tem-
plar.40  Together, they forced the Templars to admit, under tor-
ture, that they had been “required to spit on the cross, enter [into]
a pact with the Muslims, and commit sodomy with any Templar
who demanded it.”41  According to scholar Arno Karlen, this
formula of charges—heresy, treason, and homosexuality—became
routine in heresy and witchcraft trials.42
These medieval religious authorities characterized their inqui-
sition not as a punishment, but as a cure.  They prescribed, among
other practices, burning at the stake for homosexuals.43  In fact,
the term faggot referred to the kindling used to light the fire under
a criminal sentenced to burn.44
Against this backdrop, Christian denunciation of homosexual-
ity had permeated legal texts in England by the 14th century.  Sir
William Blackstone wrote that sodomy was a crime that “the ex-
press law of God, determine[s] to be capital.  Of which we have a
single instance . . . by the destruction of two cities by fire from
heaven.”45  The appropriate punishment for the sodomite was to
37 Id. The characterization of the sodomite as a homosexual has been inconsistent
throughout history.  Sodomy seemed to be used interchangeably with sex between
men, though that characterization was not exclusive.  It would not become so until
the medical profession created the term homosexual and made the homosexual sy-
nonymous with the sodomite in the 19th century.
38 ARNO KARLEN, Homosexuality in History, in HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR, A MODERN
REAPPRAISAL 75, 88 (J. Marmor ed., Basic Books, Inc. 1980).  The Cathars, for their
claimed sodomizing of their wives, were analogized to the Bogomile sect of Bulgaria
who were considered heretics.  Consequently, the French word “bougre” came into
use for sodomite.  Its English translation is “bugger” which is commonly used in En-
gland as the word for both intercourse and homosexuality. Id.
39 Id. at 88–89.
40 Id. at 89.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 HILL & CHEADLE, supra note 18, at 68.
44 Id.
45 Phong Duong, A Survey of Gay Rights Culminating in Lawrence v. Texas, 39 GONZ.
L. REV. 539, 543 (2004).
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be buried alive.46
Until the 16th century, regulation and punishment of homo-
sexuality was the exclusive province of the Roman Catholic
Church; however, the English monarchy secularized those pro-
scriptions.47  The 16th century hosted the great divide between En-
gland and the Roman Catholic Church.  Henry VIII of England, in
an effort to renounce Roman Catholic control, secularized Catho-
lic doctrine by enacting it into law.48  In 1533, the Reformation Par-
liament, at the behest of Henry VIII, made “the detestable and
abominable vice of buggery committed with mankind or beast pun-
ishable by death.”49  Elizabeth I reenacted the Act of 1533 with a
mandatory death penalty.50  At this time, however, the crime of
sodomy or buggery was not exclusively characterized as an act be-
tween two men, but also as an act between a man and a woman.51
The proscription against sodomy in the United States began
with the application of these English sodomy statutes in the colo-
nies.52  “Colonial law was essentially religious law, and ‘all crime
was . . . synonymous with sin.’”53  Colonial Protestants condemned
all sex outside of marriage and permitted sex within marriage only
for the purpose of procreation.54  John D’Emilio has suggested that
the colonists considered non-procreative sexual activity as counter-
utilitarian.55  “Sexual behavior that did not support reproduction,
not even considering the ‘counterproductive’ and ‘morally-wrong’
acts of homosexuality, was seen as deviant, [and] self-indulgent.”56
Accordingly, all non-procreative sex, including sodomy, was gener-
ally prohibited,57 although the colonies varied in their approaches
46 Id.
47 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Law and the Construction of the Closet: American Regulation
of Same-Sex Intimacy, 1880-1946, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1007, 1012 (1997), citing Act of 1533,





52 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986).
53 Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curaie Supporting Petition-
ers, at 16, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) No. 02–102, quoting WILLIAM E.
NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW:  THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON
MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY:  1760-1830 39 (1975).
54 Id.
55 See John D’Emilio, Sexual Politics, and Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homo-
sexual Minority in the United States, 1940–1970 10 (The University of Chicago Press)
(1983).
56 Duong, supra note 45.
57 Brief for American Civil Liberties Union supra note 53, at 16.
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to those prohibitions.58
After U.S. Independence, the original thirteen states adopted
anti-sodomy laws similar to the Act of 1533, though most abolished
the requirement of the death penalty as punishment.59  Similar to
their English predecessors, the laws failed to clearly define what
was meant by sodomy or buggery or to whom those acts extended.
Interestingly, the language of the laws began to reflect what Black-
stone termed the “infamous crime against nature” and made less
explicit reference to passages of the Bible.60  This clearly demar-
cates the point at which Christian ideology became cloaked behind
the façade of secular law.
The medical profession, by the 19th century, concretized this
distorted perception that Christian ideology was in fact secular law.
It created the term homosexual, clearly defined the sodomite as sy-
nonymous with the homosexual, and provided scientific justifica-
tion for discrimination against homosexuals where such
discrimination had once only been justified by adherence to the
Bible.61  In 1886, Richard von Krafft-Ebing published Psychopathia
Sexualis.62 Psychopathia Sexualis was received widely among the med-
ical profession in the United States and Europe.63  Krafft-Ebing
posited that men and women were biologically distinct and, as
58 Eskridge, supra note 47, at 1013.
The American colonies followed a variety of approaches.  The southern
and middle colonies generally assumed or legislated that the Act of
1533 and its death penalty applied within their jurisdictions. Explicitly
invoking biblical injunctions against men ‘lying’ with other men, New
England colonies adopted statutes or policies covering more activities
than the Act of 1533.  Although the Massachusetts Bay Colony seriously
considered but ultimately rejected the Reverend John Cotton’s 1636
proposal that intercourse between women be included as sodomy, the
New Haven Colony in 1656 prohibited under pain of death men lying
with men, women lying with women, masturbation (if aggravating cir-
cumstances), and any other ‘carnall knowledge.’  The crimes of mastur-
bation and women lying with women were dropped as offenses when
the Connecticut Colony was formed in 1665, however.  On the other
hand, the authorities in Connecticut and Massachusetts, like those in
Virginia, were willing to prosecute men and on at least one occasion
women for same-sex lewdness without a specific statutory basis. Alto-
gether there are records of no fewer than twenty sodomy prosecutions,
and four executions, during the colonial period.
Id.
59 Id. at 1013.
60 Id. at 1013–14.
61 Eskridge, Jr., supra note 47, at 1010–11.
62 RICHARD VON KRAFT-EBING, PSYCHOPATHIA SEXUALIS (Franklin S. Klaf trans.,
Arcade Publishing ed., 1998) (1886).
63 Eskridge, Jr., supra note 47, at 1022 (discussing Von Kraft-Ebing’s work).
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such, had different sexual instincts.64  “Man ‘has beyond doubt the
stronger sexual appetite’ and is ‘aggressive and impetuous,’ while
nurturing woman ‘remains passive’ as the man woos her.”65  Ac-
cording to Krafft-Ebing, the anthropological development of a race
was evidenced by the contrasts between the male and female gen-
ders.66  He assumed that normal sex was vaginal intercourse be-
tween the masculine male and the feminine female and described
any other sexual act as an array of deviations from that norm.67
According to Krafft-Ebing, any predisposition to deviate from the
norm was “rooted in a congenital defect in the deviant’s brain or
constitution.”68  “ ‘Inversion’ by women or men revealing physical
or psychological characteristics of the opposite sex was for Krafft-
Ebing a leading sexual pathology reflecting a broader mental or
physical ‘degeneration,’ or reversion to a prior evolutionary sta-
tus.”69  According to William Eskridge, Jr., “Americans were most
fascinated with Krafft-Ebing’s idea that any departure from strict
binary gender roles (man=masculine, woman=feminine) repre-
sented a ‘degeneration’ to more primitive forms.”70
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT
A. A Survey of Governmental Approaches to the Separation of Church
and State: Bringing Down the Establishment
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion . . . .”71  Although the text is seemingly
clear, the question of what constitutes an establishment of religion
has been a matter of controversy since before the adoption of the
Constitution.
1. Madison and Jefferson
Debate as to the role of religion in the burgeoning nation
arose in 1785 upon a proposal to establish religion in the State of
Virginia.72  Both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, two men
64 Id. at 1022–23.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1023.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.; see also JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS:  A HIS-
TORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 193 (The University of Chicago Press 1997) (1988).
70 Eskridge, Jr., supra note 47, at 1023.
71 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
72 Brief for Legal and Religious Historians and Law Scholars as Amici Curaie, at
2008] BRINGING DOWN THE ESTABLISHMENT 141
who would become instrumental in the creation and adoption of
the U.S. Constitution, came out strongly against such an establish-
ment.73  Their warnings and philosophies provide guidance for
what the framers intended when they prohibited laws respecting
the establishment of religion.74
James Madison, in his Memorial and Remonstrance against
Religious Assessments in Virginia, maintained that religion is
wholly exempt from the cognizance of civil society, and that be-
cause the legislators acted as representatives of the people, religion
was beyond the purview of the legislature.75 He insisted that free
government depended not only on a strict separation of religious
and civil authority but also that religion, in order to maintain free-
dom, must not be used in any way to overleap the civil rights of the
people.76  “The Rulers who are guilty of such an encroachment,”
he stated, “exceed the commission from which they derive their
authority, and are Tyrants. The People who submit to it are gov-
erned by laws made neither by themselves nor by an authority de-
rived from them, and are slaves.”77
Jefferson, in opposing the establishment of religion in Vir-
ginia, purported that establishment of religion not only violated
the civil rights of man, but also the will of God who “. . . chose not
to propagate [religion]” by coercion, creating in humanity a free
mind.78  According to Jefferson, the assumption of dominion over
the faith of others by legislators and rulers is impious and deprives
a citizen of his liberty.79  With respect to legally required financial
contribution to religion, Jefferson stated that “. . . to compel a man
to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions
which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical . . . .”80
After adoption of the Establishment Clause, Jefferson pro-
fessed that the “act of the whole American people which declared
that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ . . . [er-
16, Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2553 (2007) (No. 06-
157).
73 Id. at 16, 21–22.
74 Id. at 22.
75 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments in
The Papers of James Madison (June 20, 1785), available at http://www.conservative
usa.org/againstreligiousassessment.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2008).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Thomas Jefferson, The Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (1786).
79 Id.
80 Id.
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ected] a wall of separation between church and State.”81  Madison
believed that the prohibition of establishment of religion went so
far as to preclude appointment of chaplains to the Senate and
House of Representatives.82
Jefferson believed that the Establishment Clause applied not
only to Congress but also to the President.83  As President, he re-
fused to declare a national day of fasting and prayer.84  In response
to criticism, he explained that civil powers alone have been given
to the President of the United States and that he had no authority
to direct the religious exercises of his constituents.  “Congress thus
inhibited from acts respecting religion, and the Executive author-
ized only to execute their acts, I have refrained from prescribing
even occasional performances of devotion.”85
Madison, although similarly opposed to the idea of a national
day of thanksgiving, eventually succumbed to popular pressure;
however, he later regretted his actions.86  In hindsight, he wrote
that “[r]eligious proclamations by the Executive recommending
thanksgivings [and] fasts are shoots from the same root with the
legislative acts reviewed,” and thus deemed the proclamations as
“illegitimate as legislative establishment.”87
2. Black
Justice Black, writing for the majority in the seminal case, Ever-
son v. Board of Education,88 recognized the strict separation between
church and state which, according to Jefferson, had been created
with the adoption of the Establishment Clause.  Black, invoking Jef-
ferson, stressed that government and religion should in no way be
intertwined.89
81 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptists (Jan. 1, 1802).
82 James Madison, Detached Memoranda (1817).
83 See DANIEL DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BE-
TWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 41 (New York University Press 2002).
84 Id. at 40–41.
85 Id.
86 Brief for Legal and Religious Historians and Law Scholars, supra note 72, at 16.
87 Id. (quoting James Madison, Madison’s “Detached Memoranda,” 3 Wm. & Mary Q.
534, 559 (Elizabeth Fleet ed. 1946) (ca. 1817) [hereinafter Madison’s “Detached
Memoranda”].
88 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
89 Id. at 15–16.  According to Justice Black,
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to
go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished
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At issue in Everson was whether a local school board could re-
imburse the transportation costs of parents who had sent their chil-
dren to private or parochial schools.90  The Court conceded that
the Establishment Clause prohibited the contribution of tax-raised
funds to support institutions that teach the tenets of any faith; how-
ever, it held that the ordinance at issue did not violate that prohibi-
tion.91  It is unclear as to why the Court concluded as it did;
however, the Court generally mentioned that the ordinance per-
mitted reimbursement for parents who had sent their children to
non-parochial private schools.92  The Court, in its dicta, adopted
the strictly separationist views of both Madison and Jefferson, while
its holding suggested that indirect government funding of religion
was permissible.93
3. Burger
Establishment Clause jurisprudence took a dramatic turn with
Lemon v. Kurtzman,94 the case which would become the keystone of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  In Lemon, the United States
Supreme Court invalidated, in relevant part, a Pennsylvania statute
that reimbursed religious schools for the costs of teachers’ salaries
and a Rhode Island statute that directly supplemented the teach-
ers’ salaries by fifteen percent.95  In doing so, Chief Justice Burger
announced a three-pronged test for determining whether a statute
violates the Establishment Clause.  “First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the
statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement
with religion.’”96
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small,
can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or prac-
tice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or
groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against estab-
lishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation
between church and State.
Id.
90 See generally id.
91 Id. at 16.
92 Id. at 17.
93 Id. at 18.
94 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 612–13.
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The Rhode Island statute required, as a prerequisite to appli-
cation for a salary supplement, that the teacher agree in writing
“not to teach a course in religion for so long as or during such time
as he or she receives any salary supplements.”97  The Court ac-
cepted the States’ intentions to “enhance the quality of the secular
education in all schools covered by the compulsory attendance
laws”98 as a valid secular purpose.
The Court suggested with respect to the Rhode Island statute,
that direct government funding of religious activity would always
have the primary effect of advancing that religious activity.99  It
concluded that “a dedicated religious person, teaching in a school
affiliated with his or her faith and operated to inculcate its tenets,
will inevitably experience great difficulty in remaining religiously
neutral. Doctrines and faith are not inculcated or advanced by neu-
trals.”100  The Court held further that the continuing state surveil-
lance required to ensure that recipient-teachers remained
religiously neutral created excessive entanglement with religion.101
The Court also invalidated the Pennsylvania statute based on
similar grounds for invalidating the Rhode Island statute.102  The
Court distinguished Everson in response to a claim, based on the
Court’s decision in Everson, that the statute was constitutional be-
cause it provided indirect funding in the form of reimbursements
as opposed to direct payment of salary.103  The Court noted that
the indirect payment in Everson was to parents, not to the religious
schools.104
The Court also concluded, with respect to both statutes, that
the political debate along religious lines that had and would inevi-
tably continue to ensue constituted an excessive entanglement with
religion.105 The Court stated that “[o]rdinarily political debate and
division, however vigorous or even partisan, are normal and
healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government,
but political division along religious lines was one of the principal
evils against which the First Amendment was intended to
protect.”106
97 Id. at 608.
98 Id. at 613.
99 Id. at 618–19.
100 Id. at 618.
101 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620.
102 Id. at 620–21.
103 Id. at 621.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 622.
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Most notable, is the Court’s suggestion that direct government
funding of religious institutions “would be a relationship pregnant
with involvement”107 that would always require government surveil-
lance that the underlying activities were not religious and would
therefore always constitute excessive entanglement.
4. Rehnquist
Despite the Court’s suggestion, if not outright holding, in
Lemon, that direct government financial assistance to religious or-
ganizations always precipitates excessive entanglement with relig-
ion, the Court, in Bowen v. Kendrick,108 held that religious
organizations could, consistent with Lemon, receive direct financial
assistance from the government.109  In Bowen, a number of taxpay-
ers and clergy challenged the constitutionality of the Adolescent
Family Life Act, which Congress had enacted to combat teen preg-
nancy.110  Pursuant to the act, a variety of groups, including relig-
ious groups, would receive government funds to combat premarital
sex and teen pregnancy.111  Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, accepted as a valid secular purpose the “prevention of the
social and economic injury caused by teen pregnancy and premari-
tal sex.”112  The ultimate issue became whether the government’s
direct funding of religious organizations had the primary effect of
advancing religion.113  The Court held that it did not.114  The
Court held that the Establishment Clause permits direct govern-
ment funding of religious organizations but “prohibits the govern-
ment from directly funding the inculcation of religious beliefs.”115
Therefore, the Court suggested that direct funding of religious or-
ganizations by the government was permissible so long as the funds
were used for secular purposes.
Chief Justice Rehnquist also undermined, as he had done in
previous dissents, the third prong of Lemon.  He conceded that the
mechanisms required to ensure that religion is not being advanced
necessarily create an excessive entanglement with religion by the
government116; however, here the Court asserted that the religious
107 Id.
108 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
109 Id. at 593.
110 Id. at 597.
111 Id. at 594.
112 Id. at 598, 617.
113 Bowen 487 U.S. at 611–12.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 599, 606.
116 Id. at 616.
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grantees “were not pervasively sectarian in the same sense as the
court ha[d] held parochial schools to be.”117
The Court held that the statute at issue was constitutional on
its face but remanded the case to determine whether it was consti-
tutional as applied.118  The Court directed the lower court to deter-
mine whether funds had been used for religious purposes.119  In
doing so, the Court suggested that evidence of religious neutrality
permits a statute to survive constitutional scrutiny on its face.120
5. O’Connor
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s criticism of the third prong of the
test announced in Lemon precipitated a revision of the test in Agos-
tini v. Felton.121  The Court, in Agostini, considered whether the Fed-
eral Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 violated the
Establishment Clause.122  Pursuant to the Act, federal funds were
disbursed to state boards of education who in turn distributed
those funds to public schools.123  Recipients of those funds would
then send teachers to work in private and parochial schools.124
The purpose of the program was to provide assistance to the chil-
dren of low-income families who were attending private or paro-
chial schools by supplementing the cost of education.125  The
Court accepted assistance to the children of low-income families as
a valid secular purpose.126  The Court held further that the statute
did not have the primary purpose of advancing religion because
the state made the funds available, “generally without regard to the
sectarian–nonsectarian or public–nonpublic nature of the institu-
tion benefited.”127  With respect to the excessive entanglement pro-
117 Id. at 616–17 (quoting Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 (D.D.C. 1987) (quoting Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973))).
118 Id. at 621–22.
119 Id. at 622.
120 Elisabeth Divine Reid, Thou Shalt Honor the Establishment Clause: The Constitution-
ality of the Faith-Based Initiative, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 431, 452 (2007).
121 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
122 Id. at 209.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 209–10.
125 Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 404-407 (1985). Aguilar was a corollary case that
had described the mechanisms by which program function.  The program, by supple-
menting the cost of teachers, thereby supplemented the cost to attend the school.
Furthermore, parochial schools were required to remove any religious symbols from
classrooms where those teachers would be working.  The Court in Agostini overruled
Aguilar.
126 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226.
127 Id. at 225 (quoting Comm. for Pub. Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 782–83, n.38 (1973)).
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hibition, the Court expressly abandoned any presumption that
recipients would be unable to separate religious inculcation from
their secular services, as suggested in Lemon.  Consequently, gov-
ernment oversight is unnecessary to ensure that religion is not be-
ing advanced, and excessive entanglement does not result.128
Notably, the Court, in Agostini, subsumed the third prong of the
test announced in Lemon.129  The current test, which has become
referred to as the “Lemon-Agostini Test,” can be summarized as fol-
lows:  A statute that provides direct financial assistance to religious
organizations is constitutional where the statute serves a valid secu-
lar purpose and its principal or primary effect neither advances
nor inhibits religion.  A statute does not advance religion if it does
not result in governmental indoctrination, define its recipients by
reference to religion, or create excessive governmental entangle-
ment with religion.130
6. Thomas
Justice Thomas, writing for a plurality in Mitchell v. Helms,131
further diluted the test that had been announced in Lemon.  Ac-
cording to Justice Thomas, a statute serves a valid secular purpose
so long as it is applied to the state in a neutral manner.132  Accord-
ing to the plurality, a statute is neutral when “religious, irreligious,
and areligious are all alike eligible for government aid.”133  The
issue in Mitchell was whether the Federal Education Consolidation
and Improvement Act of 1981, under which public and private
schools could opt to partake in a program where the state would
provide secular educational materials purchased with federal
funds, violated the Establishment Clause.134  The plurality held that
it did not.135
Although the Lemon-Agostini Test seems to have been almost
completely abandoned, the revised test announced in Mitchell is
not binding precedent because the decision was reached by a plu-
rality, not a majority of the Justices.136  Justice O’Connor, in her
concurrence, opined that “actual diversion of government aid to
128 Id. at 233–34.
129 Id. at 234.
130 Id.
131 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
132 Id. at 809.
133 Id. at 809.
134 Id. at 801–803.
135 Id. at 801.
136 Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793.
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religious indoctrination . . . is constitutionally suspect,”137 and five
Justices agreed.  Notably, O’Connor warned that a presumption of
constitutionality where funds are disbursed by the state in a neutral
manner created too great a risk that those groups would divert
those funds for religious purposes.138
7. Bush
Former President Bush has been accused of being, among
other things, a religious zealot.139  On January 29, 2001, nine days
after taking office, President Bush issued an Executive Order which
established the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives (“WHOFBCI”).140  The President’s goal, as expressed in
the Executive Order, was to provide faith-based entities with an
equal opportunity to compete with secular service organizations
for federal funds.141  The Executive Order also described the Of-
fice’s functions and integrated the Initiative throughout several
federal agencies, “coordinated educational activities to mobilize
the public, educated state, local, and community policy makers re-
garding the ways in which they can become involved, and elimi-
nated unnecessary barriers that currently impede an effective
FBCI.”142  That same day, President Bush signed a second Execu-
tive Order creating satellite offices within five federal agencies—
the Departments of Justice, Education, Labor, Health and Human
Services, and Housing and Urban Development—and directed the
agency heads to “coordinate department efforts to eliminate regu-
latory, contracting, and other programmatic obstacles to the partic-
ipation of [faith-based and community organizations] in the
provision of social services.”143
Almost one year later, President Bush, on December 12, 2002,
issued two more Executive Orders.  One merely created satellite
offices in two more federal agencies—the Department of Agricul-
ture and the Agency for International Development144; however,
the second, and more notable of the two, established an unprece-
dented role for the Executive.  Entitled “Equal Protection of the
Laws for Faith-Based and Community Organizations,” the Execu-
137 Id. at 840.
138 Id.
139 See generally Reid, supra note 120, at 440.
140 Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,499 (Jan. 29, 2001).
141 Id.
142 Reid, supra note 120, at 440.
143 Exec. Order No. 13,198, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,497 (Jan. 29, 2001).
144 Exec. Order No. 13,280, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,145 (Dec. 12, 2002).
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tive Order extended the FBCI to all programs “administered by the
Federal government, or by a State or local government using Fed-
eral financial assistance.”145  It also implemented a number of sub-
stantive principles.146  Pursuant to the Order, religious
organizations receiving federal funds under the program are pre-
cluded from discriminating against program beneficiaries with re-
spect to religion; the organizations, however, need not abandon
their religious character.147  According to the President, that an or-
ganization may retain its religious character means that it may dis-
criminate on the basis of religion or adherence to religious
principles in hiring.148  Organizations that engage in inherently re-
ligious activity—such as “worship, religious instruction, and
proselytization—must offer those services separately in time or lo-
cation from any programs or services supported with direct federal
financial assistance, and participation in any such inherently relig-
ious activities must be voluntary for the beneficiaries of the social
service program supported with such federal financial
assistance.”149
It is important to remember that government funding of relig-
ious organizations engaged in social work did not begin with the
Bush Administration.  However, the creation of the FBCI Program
is unique in at least two ways—it was conceived and executed solely
by the Executive through the use of funds appropriated to the Ex-
ecutive Branch, and it expressly disposes of any need for religious
organizations to create a secular entity to which government funds
could flow.  Traditionally, religious charities would create entirely
separate secular affiliates for the administration of social ser-
vices.150  As a result of this process, those entities became familiar
with intricacies of government funding and knew of the constitu-
tional restraints associated with that funding.151  President Bush, in
creating the FBCI, sought to dispose of such restraints and increase
partnerships with religious organizations.  This expansion raises
concerns as to whether less experienced groups will use govern-
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Former White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, Protecting
the Civil Rights and Religious Liberty of Faith-Based Organizations: Why Religious Hiring
Rights Must Be Preserved (June 24, 2003), available at http://www.religionandsocial
policy.org/docs/general/6-24-2003_whofbci_religious_hiring_rights.pdf.
148 Id.
149 Reid, supra note 120, at 444. (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,279).
150 Sheila Suess Kennedy & Leda McIntyre Hall, What Separation of Church and State?
Constitutional Competence and the Bush Faith-Based Initiative, 5 J.L. SOC’Y 389, 390 (2004).
151 Id.
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ment funds in ways that are unconstitutional.152
B. Flast v. Cohen and Taxpayer Standing
Generally, “the interest of a federal taxpayer in seeing that
Treasury funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution does
not give rise to the kind of redressable ‘personal injury’ required
for Article III standing”153; however, the Supreme Court, in Flast v.
Cohen created an exception to this general prohibition with respect
to Establishment Clause claims.154  In Flast, the taxpayer plaintiff
had challenged the constitutionality of the Elementary and Secon-
dary Education Act of 1965 under which religious schools received
federal aid.155  The Court concluded that a plaintiff has standing to
challenge the government’s expenditure of funds as violative of the
Establishment Clause subject to a two-part test requiring that the
taxpayer establish: 1) a logical link between his or her status as a
taxpayer and the legislation attacked, and 2) a nexus between that
status and the precise nature of the alleged constitutional
violation.156
C. Recent Taxpayer Establishment Clause Challenges
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hein v. Freedom from
Religion Foundation, Inc., a number of plaintiffs used their statuses
as taxpayers to challenge government funding of religious
organizations.
152 Id.
153 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2553, 2563 (2007).
154 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
155 Id.
156 Id. at 102–03.
First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status and
the type of legislative enactment attacked.  Thus, a taxpayer will be a
proper party to allege the unconstitutionality only of exercises of con-
gressional power under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of
the Constitution.  It will not be sufficient to allege an incidental expen-
diture of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory stat-
ute. . . .  Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that
status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged.
Under this requirement, the taxpayer must show that the challenged
enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the
exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power and not simply
that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Con-
gress by Art. I, § 8.
Id.
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1. DeStefano v. Emergency Housing Group
In DeStefano v. Emergency Housing Group,157 the Second Circuit
held that New York State’s funding of the Middletown Alcohol Cri-
sis Center (“MACC”) violated the Establishment Clause.158  MACC
received ninety-five percent of its funding from the State of New
York through its Office of Alcohol and Substance Abuse Services
(“OASAS”).159  Joseph Destefano, the mayor of Middletown, New
York, in his capacity as a taxpayer, claimed that MACC’s use of Al-
coholics Anonymous (“AA”) in its recovery program violated the
Establishment Clause.160  Using the test announced in Agostini, the
court, while accepting that the state had a valid secular purpose for
funding the program, held that involvement by MACC with AA
would constitute government indoctrination with religion if AA
staff supervised meetings and showed clients AA videos.161  The
court explained that a state is responsible for indoctrination where
it directly funds programs that inculcate its recipients with
religion.162
2. Freedom from Religion Foundation v. McCallum
The district court for the Western District of Wisconsin invali-
dated a program under which the State of Wisconsin provided
funds to Faith Works, Inc., a faith-based addictions treatment pro-
gram, in Freedom from Religion Foundation v. McCallum.163  Wiscon-
sin’s governor and the head of the Department of Corrections,
among others, challenged the expenditure in their capacities as
taxpayers.164  The Department of Corrections instituted a program
under which parole officers would recommend the program to
parolees.165
Although this case presented a similar controversy to that in
157 DeStefano v. Emergency Housing Group, 247 F.3d 397 (2d Cir. 2001).
158 Id.
159 Id. at 403.
160 Id. at 404.  Alcoholics Anonymous, in its recovery program suggests that mem-
bers make “a decision to turn [their] will and [their] life over to the care of God as
[they] underst[and] Him.”  Whether this submission is in fact meant to be religious,
is highly contested.  One AA member was “saddened and offended” by the Supreme
Court’s misinterpretation of the statement.  To members, submission to belief in God
means nothing more than submission to a belief that certain things are beyond one’s
control, such as addiction to alcohol and drugs.
161 Id. at 417–420.
162 Id. at 417.
163 Freedom from Religion Foundation v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950 (W.D.
Wisc. 2002).
164 Id.
165 Id. at 962.
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DeStefano,166 where the State of New York distributed funds to a
secular organization whose association with AA led to the violation,
in McCallum, the State of Wisconsin provided funds directly to a
faith-based organization.167
The program at issue in McCallum called participants to accept
that addiction is the product of “deep ‘soul sickness’”168 and that
addiction could be overcome only through developing a personal
connection with God.169 Similar to the court in DeStefano, the court
in McCallum focused on whether the program led to religious in-
doctrination.  In its analysis, the court first determined whether the
program itself led to religious indoctrination and then considered
whether that indoctrination was fairly attributable to the govern-
ment.170  The court found that the program, which included Bible
studies and mandatory meetings on Christian values, led to relig-
ious indoctrination.171  In fact, most participants arrived with no
religious beliefs and left the program claiming some relationship
with God.172  In determining whether that indoctrination was fairly
attributable to the government, the court summarily concluded
that “[d]irect subsidies are viewed as governmental advancement
or indoctrination of religion.”173  Consequently, the expenditure of
funds to Faith Works, Inc. was found unconstitutional.174
3. Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Montana Office of Rural
Health
In Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Montana Office of Rural
Health175 the district court of Montana invalidated a program re-
ceiving funding pursuant to President Bush’s FBCI.176  The defen-
dant, the Montana Office of Rural Health’s (“MORH”) mission was
“to improve health care . . . for all Montanans through health pro-
motion, disease prevention, and reduction of the impact of illness,
disease and disability.”177  The primary director of MORH, in
166 DeStefano, 247 F.3d 397.
167 McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d. at 960.
168 Id. at 959.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 970.
171 Id. at 953.
172 Id. at 957.
173 Id. at 970 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Vir-
ginia, 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995)).
174 McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 978.
175 Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Montana Office of Rural Health, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS *29139 (D. Mont. Oct. 26, 2004).
176 Id.
177 Id. at *2.
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awarding sub-grants, gave preferential treatment to parish nursing
programs.178  The plaintiffs claimed that the state had violated the
Establishment Clause by providing funds directly to those parish
nursing programs.179  The court, applying Agostini, agreed.180  Most
notable is the court’s discussion of the secular purpose require-
ment of the Agostini test.  The court rejected the state’s asserted
purpose, which was to provide secular health care through faith-
based organizations, and instead held that the director of MORH
“acted with the clear primary purpose of promoting and endorsing
the use and application of Judeo-Christian principles in the provi-
sion of otherwise secular health care.”181  The court explained that
the Supreme Court has given deference to the “government’s state-
ment of a secular purpose” unless it is clear that the “statement is a
sham or insincere.”182  Here, the court detected such insincerity.
D. Roadway Blocked: Lown v. Salvation Army, Inc.
In Lown v. Salvation Army, Inc.,183 eighteen former employees
of the Salvation Army filed suit against the government in their
capacities as taxpayers, claiming, in relevant part, that the govern-
ment had, in funding the Social Services for Children (“SSC”), a
Salvation Army program, violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Establishment and Free Exer-
cise Clauses of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.184
The SSC, through its contract with New York State, adminis-
ters child welfare services and day care on behalf of the state.185
Nearly ninety percent of its clients are “referred by or in the cus-
tody of government agencies and are assigned to SSC involunta-
rily.”186  SSC derives nearly ninety-five percent of its budget from its
contracts with the government.187  The plaintiffs alleged that the
SSC diverted the percent of its revenue from those contracts to the
Salvation Army Church.188  Although it had not previously done so,
SSC, in the months prior to initiation of the suit, began to infuse
religion into the workplace and monitor employees for adherence
178 Id. at *4.
179 Id. at *5.
180 Id. at *37.
181 Id. at *25–26.
182 Id. at *20 (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586–87 (1987)).
183 Lown v. Salvation Army, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
184 Id. at 235.
185 Id. at 228.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 229.
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to the religious tenets of the Salvation Army.189  The Salvation
Army implemented a “Reorganization Plan” dedicated to ensuring
the employment of Salvationists and other Christians.190  As its jus-
tification for the plan, the Salvation Army stated that it was not a
social service organization, but a “Christian movement with a Social
Service Program.”191  As part of its plan, Salvation Army directors
required the Human Resources Department at SSC to compile a
report of the religious affiliations of its employees and to disclose
the names of homosexuals working at SSC.192  The SSC revised its
employee manual to include a section entitled, “The Rules of Con-
duct,” which, although advising that the Salvation Army did not
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in hiring, stated that
the Salvation Army reserved the right to make employment deci-
sions based on conduct that might be incompatible with the tenets
of the Salvation Army.193
Employees were then required to fill out a form acknowledg-
ing receipt of the manual and agree not to engage in any conduct
that would “conflict with, interfere with, or undermine,” the Salva-
tion Army’s programs.194  The Executive Director of the SSC, at the
time the policy was adopted, was fired for his disagreement with
the policy of requiring employees to make such a declaration.195
His successors, including Lown, the named plaintiff, failed to im-
plement the policy.196  Both resigned, characterizing their resigna-
tions as precipitated by a hostile work environment.197  The
plaintiffs claimed that since implementation of the Reorganization
Plan, “manifestations of Christian faith [had] appeared in the
workplace, including recitation of prayers at staff meetings and
functions, frequent depositing of religious publications in em-
ployee mailboxes, conspicuous display of religious publications
and regular public postings for prayer meetings and other religious
events.”198  The plaintiffs claimed that this resulted in a hostile
189 Id.
190 Id. at 230.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 231 (“Although ‘[t]he Salvation Army does not make employment deci-
sions on the basis of an individual’s sexual orientation or preference[,]’ it nonetheless
‘reserve[s] the right to make employment decisions on the basis of an employee’s
conduct or behavior that is incompatible with the principles of the Salvation Army.’”)
(quoting Am. Compl. ¶ 140) [internal quotations omitted].
194 Lown, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 223.
195 Id. at 232.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 233.
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work environment that precipitated the resignation of a number of
employees, including the plaintiffs.199
New York State moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ motions.  The
District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the
defendant’s motion to dismiss with respect to the Equal Protection
claim.200  It explained that the plaintiffs never alleged that the gov-
ernment had expressly classified on the basis of religion, “intended
to discriminate, nor possessed animus in the execution of the con-
tracts at issue.”201  The court ruled in favor of the defendants with
respect to the Free Exercise claim.  The court explained that in
order to prevail on a Free Exercise claim, “the [plaintiff] must
show that a state action sufficiently burdened his exercise of relig-
ion.”202  To do so, the plaintiff must demonstrate that private ac-
tion can be fairly attributed to the state based on a close nexus
between the private entity and the state.203
The court held that a sufficient nexus did not exist between
the state and the Salvation Army because the state was not responsi-
199 Id. The United States participated in the litigation as amici curiae on the grounds
that it had a particular interest in the outcome due to its Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives Program. See Former White House Office of Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives, Protecting the Civil Rights and Religious Liberty of Faith-Based Organizations:
Why Religious Hiring Rights Must Be Preserved, available at http://www.religionandsocial
policy.org/docs/general/6-24-2003_whofbci_religious_hiring_rights.pdf.
200 Lown, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 237.
201 Id. at 236.
202 Lown, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 241 (quoting Genas v. State of N.Y. Dep’t of Corr.
Servs., 75 F.3d 825, 831 (2d Cir. 1996)).
203 Id. at 242. The court stated:
For SSC’s personnel policies to be properly characterized as state ac-
tion, plaintiffs must claim ‘both an alleged constitutional deprivation
caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or
by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the
State is responsible, and that the party charged with the deprivation
must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.’ . . . ‘For the
conduct of a private entity to be fairly attributable to the state, there
must be such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action
that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself.’ . . . ‘A nexus of “state action” exists between a private entity and
the state when “the state exercises coercive power, is entwined in the
management or control of the private actor, or provides the private ac-
tor with significant encouragement, either overt or covert, or when the
private actor operates as a willful participant in joint activity with the
State or its agents, is controlled by an agency of the State, has been
delegated a public function by the state, or is entwined with governmen-
tal policies.” ’ . . . The close nexus requirement is meant to ‘assure that
constitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said that the
State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff
complains.’
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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ble for the conduct of which the plaintiffs complained, rendering
the nexus requirement unsatisfied.204  The court reached this con-
clusion despite the fact that SSC received ninety percent of its
funds from government contracts.205
The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss with re-
spect to the Establishment Clause claim based on taxpayer stand-
ing.206  The court conceded that the plaintiffs had standing to
challenge the government funding based on the exception created
by Flast v. Cohen.207 However, it did not reach a decision on the
merits of the claim.208  The Establishment Clause challenge, made
by the plaintiffs in their capacities as taxpayers, was their only claim
to survive.209
E. No Detour: Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.
The Supreme Court, however, seemingly foreclosed that possi-
bility, at least with respect to actions by the Executive, in Hein v.
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.210
In Hein, the plaintiff claimed that the conferences held as part
of President Bush’s FBCI Program, that contained speeches using
“‘religious imagery’ and praised the efficacy of faith-based pro-
grams in delivering social services,”211 violated the Establishment
Clause.  The plaintiff, a corporation opposed to government en-
dorsement of religion, relied on its status as a taxpayer to file the
suit.212  The issue in Hein ultimately became whether the plaintiff
had standing in that capacity.213  The Court recognized the excep-
tion created by Flast v. Cohen, but framed the issue as whether that
exception, which permits taxpayers to challenge the constitutional-
ity of government expenditures with respect to religion, applied to
expenditures made by the Executive Branch.  The Court held that
it did not.214
In doing so, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that had held that
federal taxpayers have standing to “challenge Executive Branch
204 Id.
205 Id. at 239.
206 Id. at 239–41.
207 Id. at 238–39.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 241.
210 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2553 (2007).
211 Id. at 2559.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 2559.
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programs on Establishment Clause grounds so long as the activities
are ‘financed by Congressional appropriation.’”215  The majority of
the Seventh Circuit concluded that taxpayers have standing to chal-
lenge expenditures “even where ‘there is no statutory program’ en-
acted by Congress and the funds are ‘from appropriations for the
general administrative expenses, over which the President and
other executive branch officials have’ . . . discretionary power.”216
The Court of Appeals overruled the district court, which had dis-
missed the plaintiff’s claims for lack of standing by concluding that
“federal taxpayer standing is limited to Establishment Clause chal-
lenges to the constitutionality of ‘exercises of congressional power
under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8.’”217
After a lengthy discussion of the principle and requirements
of standing, the Supreme Court narrowly construed the exception
created by Flast v. Cohen.218  The respondents asserted that Flast v.
Cohen created an exception through which a taxpayer could chal-
lenge the expenditure of all government funds as a violation of the
Establishment Clause219; however, the Supreme Court, by a con-
trolling plurality, characterized the exception as applying only to
those expenditures made pursuant to an act of Congress.220
The Court warned that “[b]ecause almost all Executive
Branch activity is ultimately funded by some Congressional appro-
priation, extending the Flast exception to purely executive expend-
itures would effectively subject every federal action—be it a
conference, proclamation or speech—to Establishment Clause
challenge by any taxpayer in federal court.”221
Justice Souter, with whom Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer joined, seeing no basis for distinguishing between expendi-
tures by the Executive and Legislative Branches in either logic or
precedent, dissented.222  Souter, citing Flast and invoking Madison,
maintained that the “‘injury’ alleged in Establishment Clause chal-
lenges to federal spending” is “the very extract[ion] and
spen[ding] of ‘tax money’ in aid of religion.”223
In a sharply worded concurrence, Justice Scalia, with whom
215 Id. at 2561 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 433 F. 3d 989, 997 (7th Cir. 2006)).
216 Id. at 2561 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 433 F. 3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2006)).
217 Id. at 2561 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88, 88 S. Ct. 1942 (2007)).
218 Hein, 127 S.Ct. at 2565.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 2569.
222 Id. at 2584.
223 Id. at 2584–85 (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 348
(2006)).
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Justice Thomas joined, accused the plurality of making unreasoned
and unprincipled distinctions between expenditures by the Execu-
tive and Legislative Branches.224  Justice Scalia concurred in the
judgment because he believes the exception created by Flast v. Co-
hen was wholly without merit, therefore agreeing that the respon-
dents did not have standing.  However, he criticized the majority
for drawing the distinction it drew, urging the majority either to
reject Flast entirely or apply it universally.225
Justice Scalia opined that the plurality’s opinion invited de-
monstrably absurd results.  “For example,” he stated, “the plurality
would deny standing to a taxpayer challenging the President’s dis-
bursement to a religious organization of a discrete appropriation
that Congress had not explicitly allocated to that purpose, even if
everyone knew that Congress and the President had informally ne-
gotiated that the entire sum would be spent in that precise
manner.”226
III. IMPLICATIONS
A. Taxpayer Standing Limited
1. The Far-reaching Implications of Hein v. Freedom from
Religion Foundation, Inc.
The structure and purpose of President Bush’s FBCI is discon-
certingly vague.  It is almost impossible to understand how the sys-
tem works and the specific functions it serves.  The President’s
statements with regard to the initiative demonstrate that the pro-
gram was created to ensure that faith-based groups have the oppor-
tunity to compete equally with secular organizations; however,
precisely what constitutes such an assurance is unclear.  The nomi-
nal information that exists explains that the initiative is not in itself
a source of funding—its purpose is to eliminate barriers to the re-
ceipt of federal funding by faith-based groups from sources already
in existence.  The FBCI offices throughout the agencies are over-
seers in place to ensure that barriers to the receipt of funding, in-
cluding regulations, are eliminated.
224 Id. at 2573.
225 Id. at 2573–74 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“If this Court is to decide cases by rule of
law rather than show of hands, we must surrender to logic and choose sides: Either
Flast v. Cohen, should be applied to (at a minimum) all challenges to the governmen-
tal expenditure of general tax revenues in a manner alleged to violate a constitutional
provision specifically limiting the taxing and spending power, or Flast should be repu-
diated.”) (internal citation omitted).
226 Id. at 2580.
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However, the program clearly has a more substantive compo-
nent.  Groups can receive government funds pursuant to the pro-
gram because those groups, in the absence of the initiative, might
have previously been denied.  Furthermore, the Executive Orders
responsible for the creation of the initiative provide that a faith-
based group need not create independent secular entities for the
administration of social services or abandon their religious charac-
ter.  This means that faith-based organizations may discriminate on
the basis of religion with regard to hiring, though they may not
deny aid to prospective recipients of those services on the basis of
religion.
The underlying issue in Hein was not whether the substantive
component of the program, namely, assuring that faith-based orga-
nizations had equal access to federal funds, was constitutionally
permissible; rather, the issue was whether speeches containing
“‘religious imagery’ and prais[ing] the efficacy of faith-based pro-
grams in delivering social services,” delivered at conferences organ-
ized at the behest of the Executive and financed through Executive
funds, constituted an unconstitutional endorsement of religion by
the government in violation of the Establishment Clause.227  Ulti-
mately, the Supreme Court was not asked to decide whether simpli-
fying the process by which faith-based organizations could receive
funding was constitutional but rather to determine whether the ex-
penditures made by the Executive to organize the religion-tinged
conferences, or to pay the salaries of those who organized the con-
ferences or delivered the speeches, constituted government-
funded endorsement of religion.  However, the Supreme Court in
Hein effectively neutralized the issue by denying taxpayer standing
to challenge expenditures, made by the Executive, of funds ac-
quired through general executive appropriations with respect to
the Establishment Clause.
Although Justice Scalia called for the abandonment of tax-
payer standing in his concurrence, he illuminated the far-reaching
implications of the plurality’s opinion in Hein.  The immediate
consequence of the Court’s decision in Hein is that proselytization
by the Executive branch is effectively immunized from judicial re-
view with respect to Establishment Clause claims. Therefore,
proselytization by the Executive has become, for all practical pur-
poses, permissible so long as that proselytization is funded through
general executive appropriations.  However, the Court, by retain-
ing the Flast exception with respect to expenditures made by Con-
227 Id. at 2559.
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gress, has made those expenditures, which would be immunized if
made by the Executive, subject to Establishment Clause challenge.
The result certainly contradicts Madison’s statement that
“‘[r]eligious proclamations by the Executive . . . are shoots from
the same root with . . . legislative acts reviewed,’ and thus [are] . . .
as illegitimate as legislative establishment.”228
The prospect that the Executive Branch may proselytize, how-
ever, is less alarming than the other possibilities opened by the
Court’s decision in Hein.  As Justice Scalia suggests, the Executive
may, immune from judicial review, implement programs that bla-
tantly violate the Establishment Clause so long as those programs
are financed through general executive appropriations and not
specifically appropriated by Congress to that end.  For example,
the President could reorganize the FBCI so as to constitute a new
source of funding for private faith-based organizations; he could
eliminate any safeguard that those groups will not use those funds
to inculcate religion, and in fact, he could encourage those groups
to do so; he could decide to fund only those groups which advance
the religion to which he adheres; or he could decide to fund only
those religious groups which promote an agenda with which he
agrees.  Further, he could direct those groups to deny services to
potential recipients based on their religious affiliations; and could
direct those groups to deny services to potential recipients whose
practices conflict with the tenets of a particular religion.  This
could all occur, of course, only where the funds expended by the
Executive to implement the program or fund its recipients were
derived from general executive appropriations.  The plurality in
Hein suggests that Congress would never make an appropriation so
large and undefined as to permit this parade of horribles; however,
as Justice Scalia suggests, there is nothing to prevent Congress and
the President from negotiating as to the purpose of executive ap-
propriations “behind closed doors” while formally labeling those
appropriations “general.”
By immunizing the Executive Branch from accountability to
taxpayers, the Supreme Court has effectively given license to the
Executive to proselytize or make expenditures in ways that would
undoubtedly violate the Establishment Clause had such proselytiza-
tion or expenditures been made by Congress.  The plurality in Hein
warned that construing Flast so as to apply to actions by the Execu-
tive would bring into question any number of actions by the Execu-
228 Brief for Legal and Religious Historians and Law Scholars, supra note 72, at 16
(quoting Madison’s “Detached Memoranda,” supra note 87).
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tive with respect to the Establishment Clause.  However, it is
difficult to understand why such a result would be scorned as op-
posed to celebrated since the very purpose of the Establishment
Clause was to prevent “the very ‘extract[ion] and spen[ding]’ of
‘tax money’ in aid of religion.”229
B. Government Dis-Establishment
1. Government Funding of Faith-based Social Service
Organizations Serves No Secular Purpose
The meaning of the Establishment Clause has been irrepara-
bly distorted.  What was once perceived as an impenetrable wall
between church and state has become a discourse impotent with
language of neutrality and elementized tests.  Current Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence has rendered unrecognizable what
Madison and Jefferson understood it to symbolize and even what
the Court had understood it to mean in Everson.  Courts can no
longer distinguish between secular interests and religious interests.
Religion has become so predominant in our culture that the courts
often take for granted that the interests it accepts as secular are
based on religious ideologies.
The United States, for its own failure to provide for its citizens,
has turned to faith-based organizations to fulfill the duties that it
has failed to perform.  What seems beyond the purview of the
Court’s understanding is that faith-based organizations engage in
social service activities because of their faiths.  It is religion that
drives them, and, similar to the perspective of the Salvation Army,
they are not social service organizations but religions that, in the
context of their faiths, perform social work.  From that perspective,
any claim that government funding of faith-based organizations
serves a secular purpose seems beyond comprehension.  Funding
of faith-based social services organizations merely assists those orga-
nizations in performing those services their religions call them to
provide.  Similar to the district court’s suggestion in Freedom from
Religion Foundation v. Montana Office of Rural Health, government
funding of faith-based organizations in some situations does not
assist in providing secular services; it promotes the use and applica-
tion of religious principles in the administration of otherwise secu-
lar services.230
229 See Hein, 127 S.Ct. at 2585 (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S.
332, 348).
230 See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Montana Office of Rural Health,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29139, 25–26 (D. Mont. 2004).
162 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:129
The Court has given great deference to the government in its
assertions of a secular purpose; however, it has afforded that defer-
ence, in the context of funding of faith-based organizations (and
with regard to justifying discrimination against homosexuals), un-
wisely.  It is admittedly difficult to distinguish, given the Christian
influence in the United States, secular justifications from religious
justifications; however, in the context of state funding of faith-
based organizations, the distinction could not be any clearer.  Rec-
ognition of the fact that it is religion that drives these organizations
to provide the services they do makes any consideration of whether
those services have the primary effect of advancing religion, result
in governmental indoctrination, define recipients by reference to
religion, or create excessive governmental entanglement with relig-
ion, obvious and inconsequential.231
Current Establishment Clause jurisprudence requires that di-
rect government funding of a faith-based organization serve a valid
secular purpose and that it not advance religion.232  In determin-
ing whether the expenditure advances religion, the Court consid-
ers whether the expenditure results in governmental
indoctrination with religion, whether it defines its recipients by ref-
erence to religion, or creates excessive entanglement with relig-
ion.233  Courts have repeatedly suggested that the oversight
required to ensure that government funds are not being used for
the promotion of religion necessarily creates an excessive entangle-
ment with religion.  However, the more proper assertion is that the
funding itself creates the excessive entanglement.  It seems clear
that the funding is problematic if it requires intensive government
oversight to ensure its proper use.  Irrespective of the legalese, it
seems, as a matter of common sense, that when the government
pays religious organizations to provide services that it has failed to
perform the payment itself creates an excessive entanglement be-
tween the government and that religious organization.  If one ac-
cepts the assertion that faith-based organizations provide social
services because of and in furtherance of their religious mission, it
is undeniable that the government’s funding of those services ad-
vances that religion and that there is no use of that funding which
is not religious.
More interesting are prohibitions against religious indoctrina-
tion and the definition of recipients with respect to religion.  If the
231 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
232 Id.
233 Id.
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government were to fund organizations based only on formal affili-
ations with recognizable religions, or if government funded ser-
vices caused their recipients to identify with a particular religion,
courts would, under the current standard, generally find the gov-
ernment expenditure impermissible.  However, the focus of the
courts is misdirected.
Courts consistently fail to recognize that for some, perhaps
even most, beliefs and practices are informed by religious affilia-
tion and ideology and, with respect to faith-based social service or-
ganizations, those practices and beliefs pervade the services they
provide.  Indoctrination does not result only where a program par-
ticipant adopts a belief in Jesus Christ or Allah as a result of partici-
pation in the program.  Indoctrination occurs where a participant
adopts a belief or practice associated with the religion that has ad-
ministered the program.  Therefore, if a faith-based organization
were to promote abstinence until marriage as a means for prevent-
ing sexually transmitted diseases or denounce homosexuality or
abortion, and a recipient of that service were to adopt a belief that
she had done something wrong by contracting a sexually transmit-
ted disease or by having sex before marriage; or by having an abor-
tion; or if she failed to have an abortion because she had learned it
was not a viable option; or if she adopted an aversion toward
homosexuals as a result of her participation, then she is indoctri-
nated with that religion.
Similarly, while it is impermissible for an organization to deny
a prospective recipient services because of his religious affiliation,
it may deny those services because of beliefs he may hold or prac-
tices in which he may engage that do not comport with the tenets
of the organization’s religion.  Under the current framework, if an
organization were to deny services to drug users, or homosexuals,
or women who have had abortions, or any other person who had
engaged in activity with which the organization did not agree, it
would be permissible.  To discriminate on the basis of religion
means more than denying services to someone because he is a Jew,
or a Christian, or a Muslim—it means denying services to a person
because one does not agree, based on his religious beliefs, with the
actions or “lifestyle” of that person. This sort of religious activity
can never be separate in time or place from the social services it
provides.  If one is to understand religion as a series of practices
and beliefs, one could recognize that religion is present during
every point at which the service is administered—the religion is
inherent in the service.
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Pursuant to President Bush’s Executive Order, organizations
that engage in inherently religious activity, such as “worship, relig-
ious instruction, and proselytization, must offer those services sepa-
rately in time or location from any programs or services supported
with direct federal financial assistance, and participation in any
such inherently religious activities must be voluntary for the benefi-
ciaries of the social service program supported with such federal
financial assistance.”234  President Bush similarly misconstrues ac-
tivities or justifications that are inherently religious.  One must rec-
ognize that given the nature of faith-based organizations, all
activities in which they engage are inherently religious—they are
driven by their faiths to administer the activities and therefore the
activities, even social services, are inherently religious.  Further-
more, the manner in which faith-based organizations provide their
social services is inherently religious—in the methods they use, the
concepts to which they adhere, and the clientele to which they
choose to cater.
2. Governmental Discrimination Against Homosexuals
Violates the Establishment Clause
Justifications for discrimination against homosexuals have be-
come similarly convoluted.  Courts either do not recognize, or fail
to admit, that interests asserted by the government to justify the
denial of equal benefits and equal opportunities to homosexuals
are inherently Christianity-based.  As such, those justifications
render discrimination against homosexuals unconstitutional pursu-
ant to the Establishment Clause.
Aversion to homosexuality is pervasive in the dominant de-
nominations of Christianity and more particularly, in Catholicism.
Traditionally, homosexuals and sodomites were subject to punish-
ment by death and torture; however, many Christians now view ho-
mosexuality as a yoke that each homosexual must bear.  The
homosexual is meant to remain celibate so as not to commit the sin
he has the tendency to commit.  For his suffering, they would say,
the homosexual will be rewarded in the afterlife.
However, this form of discrimination is moderate compared to
those more fanatical sects of Christians who view homosexuals as
predators, a group of persons conspiring to transform children
into homosexuals themselves.  Others, some of whom are our na-
tion’s leaders, view HIV/AIDS as punishment for the homosex-
234 Reid, supra note 120, at 444.
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ual—a plague sent by God to purge the United States of these
sinners.
Either form of discrimination against homosexuals—moder-
ate or fanatical—is impermissible in a nation founded on a separa-
tion between church and State; yet such discrimination is pervasive
in U.S. law.  Christianity has become so deeply embedded in the
law that the government, the courts, and the electorate can no
longer distinguish those state interests that are secular from those
that are merely an imposition of Christian ideology.  This phenom-
enon is reflected both in government funding of faith-based orga-
nizations and in the justifications used to deny homosexuals equal
treatment, equal opportunities—indeed, equal citizenship.  Some,
President Bush for example, celebrate the influence of Christianity
in the law.  President Bush’s actions were guided by what some
would call fanatical adherence to Christian views.  His lack of re-
morse for questionable actions is justified by his sense of morality,
which clearly distinguishes what is right from what is wrong.235
Many Christians find this sort of advocacy comforting.  While
others, with respect to discrimination against homosexuals, have
merely misconstrued religious justifications for secular ones.  The
inability to distinguish Christian from secular justifications, at least
with respect to homosexuality, has its roots in history.  Although
homosexuality was accepted, and even condoned at the time of the
Greek Empire, civil law became, at the rise of the Roman Empire,
Christian law.  The Catholic Church and the civil government were
indistinguishable, as emperors like Justinian served at the pleasure
of the Church.  Everyone recognized that the law was based on
Christianity; yet, it seems, in time, the people had forgotten and
began to characterize Christian ideals as secular truths.  This con-
flation, at least with respect to the United States, can be attributed
primarily to two moments in history—England’s purposefully disas-
235 Megan A. Kemp, Blessed Are the Born Again: An Analysis of Christian Fundamental-
ists, the Faith-Based Initiative, and the Establishment Clause, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1523,
1534–35 (2007).  According to Megan A. Kemp,
President Bush views society in moral absolutes that are informed by a
rigid faith.  The President demonstrates this worldview each time he is
confronted with dissenting opinions and differing points of view; he
summarily dismisses opposition and reaffirms his views as morally supe-
rior.  In the arena of domestic policy, Bush’s worldview translates into
dogmatic positions on values questions.  Life begins at conception, and
all abortion is wrong.  The Bible condemns homosexuality and there-
fore the government cannot condone nonheterosexuality by any means.
Only abstinence can prevent pregnancy and the spread of sexually
transmitted diseases.
Id.
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sociation from the Catholic Church, and, in the 19th century, the
medical profession’s re-characterization of homosexuality as an ev-
olutionary defect.
In an effort to clearly break with the Catholic Church, En-
gland, in the 16th century, statutorily enacted law governing behav-
ior that had previously been governed exclusively by the Catholic
Church.  This symbol on the part of the monarchy created the illu-
sion that the monarchy no longer acted at the behest of the Catho-
lic Church, but was a nation of civil law.  However, the
proscriptions against homosexuality were merely Christian ideals
re-characterized as secular law.  This law made its way to the colo-
nies and eventually arose in State statutes.  The statutes generally
referred to sodomy and did not universally characterize the act as
an act exclusively between two men; however, the proscriptions
against sodomy were rooted in the Christian denunciation of non-
procreative sex.  Discrimination against homosexuality in the law
has been characterized as deeply rooted in our nation’s history for
that reason; yet, in reality the roots of such discrimination lead to
Christianity.  Consequently, those proscriptions violate the Estab-
lishment Clause because they serve no valid secular purpose.
The medical profession, and especially Richard von
Krafft–Ebing in the 19th century gave scientific justification to dis-
crimination against homosexuals.  Krafft–Ebing, in Psychopathia Sex-
ualis, both concretized the sodomite as synonymous with the
homosexual, and, by characterizing homosexuality as an evolution-
ary defect, gave society a medical justification for its repression.  He
assumed that normal intercourse was penile-vaginal intercourse,
and that any deviation from the norm was a sign of de-evolution.
Petitioners and their amici in Lawrence v. Texas236 insisted that
historically, the practice of sodomy was not associated exclusively
with homosexuals and therefore that Texas’s statute, which
criminalized sodomy between persons of the same sex, but not per-
sons of the opposite sex, was underinclusive.237  Those advocates
purported that the Bible’s prohibition of sodomy was not a denun-
ciation of homosexuality but a denunciation of sex without the pos-
sibility of procreation.  They argued, therefore, that the Texas
statute at issue, which prohibited only homosexual sodomy, was un-
derinclusive because heterosexual sodomy could similarly not lead
236 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
237 See Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae In Support of Petitioners at 21,
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) (citing Respondent’s Brief in
Opposition at 18).
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to procreation.  In doing so, they conceded the state’s interest in
ensuring procreation within marriage.238
Those advocates, however, glaringly missed the point by using
the Bible as the justification to override a statute.  Similar to the
statute’s proponents who used the Bible to justify the discrimina-
tion against homosexuals, these advocates used their interpretation
of the Bible to justify its invalidity, thereby reifying the place of the
Bible as an instrument by which one should determine the consti-
tutionality of a law.  What the statute’s opponents either failed to
realize, or felt was too controversial to suggest, is that the Bible’s
teaching with regard to homosexuality is irrelevant to the matter of
whether a statute is constitutional.  Using any religious text as the
basis for the construction or interpretation of law blatantly violates
the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.  In Lawrence, the
State of Texas, as justification for the statute, asserted that
“[h]omosexual conduct cannot lead to biological reproduction, or
occur within or lead to a marital relationship.”239  Notably, the
Catholic Church uses that same justification for denouncing
homosexuality.240
Interestingly, the Court framed the issue such that it con-
cluded that the right to privacy, derived from the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, included a right to consen-
sual, sexual conduct within the home.  By doing so, the Court was
able to avoid the issue of whether homosexuals must be treated
equally to heterosexuals under the law in the context of sexual con-
duct or otherwise.241 However, Justice O’Connor, in her concur-
rence, utilized equal protection.  Although she did not assert that
there were no legitimate interests that would justify unequal treat-
ment of homosexuals,242 she felt that the statute at issue in particu-
lar demonstrated no other interest than moral disapproval of a
particular group of people and that such disapproval was insuffi-
cient to justify a law that discriminates among a group of persons
under rational basis review.243
238 Id. at 21–22.
239 Respondent’s Brief in Opp. to Petitioner at 18, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003) (No. 02-102).
240 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 11, 566 § 2357.
241 See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
242 Preserving the traditional institution of marriage, according to O’Connor, is a
legitimate state interest. Id.
243 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582.
Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is
an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the
Equal Protection Clause.  Indeed, we have never held that moral disap-
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Among those surprised with O’Connor’s conclusion was Jus-
tice Scalia who, in his dissent, scoffed at O’Connor’s suggestion
that morality was not a sufficient justification for law.  He recog-
nized the impact that O’Connor’s conclusion could have on limit-
ing marriage to opposite-sex couples and correctly asserted that:
[The] reasoning leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limit-
ing marriage to opposite-sex couples. [Justice O’Connor] seeks
to preserve them by the conclusory statement that “preserving
the traditional institution of marriage” is a legitimate state inter-
est. But “preserving the traditional institution of marriage” is
just a kinder way of describing the State’s moral disapproval of
same-sex couples. Texas’s interest . . . could be recast in similarly
euphemistic terms: “preserving the traditional sexual mores of
our society.” In the jurisprudence Justice O’Connor has seem-
ingly created, judges can validate laws by characterizing them as
“preserving the traditions of society” (good); or invalidate them
by characterizing them as “expressing moral disapproval”
(bad).244
Disturbingly, Justice Scalia’s characterization of Justice
O’Connor’s statement is completely accurate.  However, both Jus-
tices Scalia and O’Connor fail to recognize the ultimate issue.  Us-
ing morality to justify discrimination against homosexuals in the
context of marriage or otherwise is not simply a question of
whether it may constitute a legitimate state interest under equal
protection analysis, but is a question of whether Christian ideolo-
gies may be imposed to validate unequal treatment of a class of
citizens.
In the context of same-sex marriage, courts have begun to
frame justifications for the exclusion of homosexuals from the in-
stitution less in terms of moral superiority of heterosexuals over
homosexuals, but rather emphasize the purposes the traditional in-
stitution functions to serve.  Homosexuals are precluded from par-
taking in that institution not because they are morally inferior but
because they cannot fulfill the purposes that marriage serves.  What
the courts fail to recognize, however, is that their characterizations
of the purposes of marriage are based on the same Christian ideol-
ogies that denounce homosexuality.  Recently, in Hernandez v. Ro-
proval, without any other asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale
under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates
among groups of persons.
Id.
244 Id. at 601–02.
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bles,245 the Court of Appeals of the State of New York held that the
equal protection provision of the New York State Constitution did
not preclude exclusion of homosexuals from the institution of mar-
riage.  Among the asserted state interests were the interests of en-
couraging procreation within marriage and encouraging
heterosexual couples to procreate.246  Chief Judge Kaye, while dis-
senting, conceded that “encouraging opposite-sex couples to marry
before they have children is certainly a legitimate interest of the
State[.]”247  She concluded, however, that the exclusion of same-
sex couples from marriage in no way furthered that interest.  Judge
Kaye, in her dissent, rejected the interest of encouraging hetero-
sexual couples to procreate; however, she accepted, as a legitimate
state interest, encouraging opposite-sex couples to procreate
within marriage.  Interestingly, the Catholic Church, the most
dominant sect of Christianity and, as described above, the source
of Christianity in the law, finds that same interest highly
compelling.248
Even those who have advocated an end to discrimination
against homosexuals have used Christian ideology as their justifica-
tion for reform.  This evidences just how deeply Christian ideology
has become embedded in the law.  However, it becomes apparent,
when one recognizes that the source of discrimination against
homosexuals is Christianity, that any justification for that discrimi-
nation serves no valid purpose, let alone a secular one.  Discrimina-
tion against homosexuals is often justified by claims that a majority
of Americans agree with such discrimination.  As of 2007, Chris-
tians comprised 78.5% of the population in the United States, so
there may be merit to that claim.249  However, oppression by a re-
ligious majority is exactly what the Establishment Clause was de-
signed to prevent.250
3. Faith-Based Organizations and the Executive
Discriminate Against Homosexuals
As was demonstrated in Lown, faith-based groups, through
245 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
246 Id. at 391.
247 Id.
248 See generally CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 11.
249 CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK-UNITED STATES, https://www.cia.gov/library/publi
cations/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2009).
250 See Sanja Zgonjanin, Quoting the Bible: The Use of Religious References in Judicial
Decision-making, 9 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 31, 66 (2005) (warning that religious references in
the law coerce the minority to accept the “norms of the majority”).
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Presidential mandate, may discriminate on the basis of homosexu-
ality in hiring.251  The FBCI permits faith-based organizations re-
ceiving funding to retain their religious character in hiring.  In
Lown, the Salvation Army used its faith to eradicate homosexuality
from its workforce.  The Salvation Army received ninety-five per-
cent of its revenues from the government; yet, it was able to
demonstrate blatant animus toward homosexuals and justify that
discrimination by its religious tenets.  For practical purposes, Lown
demonstrates that the government may further an anti-homosexual
agenda by contracting with private faith-based organizations that
use religions beliefs to justify discrimination.  As was discussed pre-
viously, that discrimination is not limited to its hiring practices.  Al-
though faith-based organizations receiving government funding
may not deny services to potential recipients on the basis of relig-
ion, there is nothing to prevent those organizations from alienat-
ing homosexuals through the practices and beliefs to which they
adhere. The conflation of religious and secular interests in the
United States has led to the acceptance of justifications for the de-
nial of services as secular where those justifications are, in fact,
rooted in religious ideology.  For example, a faith-based organiza-
tion may offer HIV/AIDS services only to those who had con-
tracted HIV through a blood transfusion.  That HIV/AIDS service
may be centered in Manhattan, and the leaders of that organiza-
tion would know that the majority of HIV/AIDS infection occurs in
New York City by unprotected sex between men.  The faith-based
organization may make a conscious decision not to serve that clien-
tele because it believes their conduct is sinful and that their afflic-
tion with HIV/AIDS is merely due punishment.  In doing so, the
faith-based organization has used religion to deny its services to a
group of people who do not adhere to the tenets of its religion; yet,
it is likely its decision to serve only HIV/AIDS patients who had
contracted the disease through blood transfusions would not be
construed as such.
This is merely to demonstrate that religion pervades our cul-
ture.  If a faith-based group is privately funded, its denial of services
to persons based on their religious beliefs may be reprehensible
but not legally cognizable; however, where the government funds
those groups, it has endorsed the practices and prejudices of a re-
ligious group.  Proponents of faith-based groups would assert that
the hypothetical group described above is providing a social ser-
251 See Lown, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 255.
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vice—treatment of HIV/AIDS; yet opponents realize the potential
for abuse.
The Supreme Court, in Hein, has exacerbated that potential
for abuse.  As a result of its decision, the Executive Branch may do
directly, through expenditure of general executive appropriations,
that which had been done indirectly in Lown.  The Executive
Branch may expend its general appropriations to proselytize
against homosexuality and fund faith-based organizations directly
to do so.  Faith-based organizations receiving funding from a direct
grant by the Executive could blatantly discriminate on the basis of
religion and still be immune from judicial review.  Any safeguard
that might have existed before Hein has, in a sense, become incon-
sequential, because taxpayers no longer have standing to challenge
violations of the Establishment Clause so long as a group is funded
though general executive appropriations.  The Supreme Court, in
Hein, suggested that limiting taxpayer standing only to Congres-
sional expenditures did not foreclose the possibility that others
would have standing to challenge those executive expenditures.252
However, it remains unclear to whom and to which challenges it
was referring.  It is clear that a faith-based group who had applied
for executive funds and was denied the funds would have no incen-
tive to challenge the constitutionality of a program on the basis of
the Establishment Clause—as it would be, itself, a faith-based
group.  Furthermore, such an action would be inappropriate; more
appropriate would be an Equal Protection claim—where two simi-
larly situated faith-based groups had been denied equal treatment.
However, this tactic offers no recourse with respect to the Estab-
lishment Clause violation.
Furthermore, the District Court for the Southern District of
New York suggested that a person who had been discriminated
against in hiring on the basis of religion had no other recourse
than to make an Establishment Clause claim against the govern-
ment, from which the faith-based group had received its funding.
Even assuming the current safeguards apply—that a group cannot
deny services on the basis of religion—it seems clear that if a per-
son were denied services based on practices with which the relig-
ious organization disagreed, he would similarly only have an
Establishment Clause claim against the government.253
252 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2553, 2571–72
(2007).
253 The court in Lown concluded that although the Salvation Army had received
95% of its revenues from government contracts, it could not be characterized as a
state actor.  Therefore, the court held that the protections of the Equal Protection
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Given the provisions of the FBCI, that a group may discrimi-
nate on the basis of religion in hiring, an Establishment Clause
claim would unlikely be successful; however, after Hein, the possi-
bility that the question would even be entertained by the courts—
insofar as a group is funded by the Executive Branch—has been
foreclosed. Hein, by denying standing to taxpayers to challenge
general expenditures by the Executive Branch, has denied those
taxpayers the ability to challenge the actions, however discrimina-
tory, of executively funded faith-based organizations.  The original
purpose of the Establishment Clause, therefore, has been rendered
meaningless.
CONCLUSION
Hein v. Freedom of Religion Foundation, Inc. has given the Execu-
tive Branch license to proselytize through the use of its general
appropriations by foreclosing the ability of federal taxpayers to
challenge the proselytization on the basis of the Establishment
Clause.  Further, the Court’s decision has also opened the possibil-
ity that the Executive, through its general appropriations, may
fund faith-based organizations thereby rendering their actions sim-
ilarly immunized from judicial review.  Government funding of
faith-based groups, by any branch of the government, violates the
Establishment Clause.  It serves no valid secular purpose and, be-
cause those groups provide social services pursuant to their relig-
ious beliefs, inevitably advances religion.  This violation, however,
has become unclear as society has embedded religion, particularly
Christianity, in the law.  The government and the electorate con-
flate religious justifications for government actions with secular
justifications.
This conflation has especially polluted the discourse surround-
ing homosexual equality.  The State uses Christian ideology as justi-
fication for discriminating against homosexuals.  However, because
that ideology has become so deeply embedded in our law, it is un-
recognizable as such.  Pursuant to President Bush’s FBCI, religious
groups, including those advocating religions that denounce homo-
sexuality, may discriminate in hiring on the basis of homosexuality.
They may also pervert the meaning of social service by injecting
religious ideologies into the practice of otherwise secular services.
The Supreme Court, in Hein, has not only given the Executive
Clause and Free Exercise Clauses did not apply.  The only claim to survive was an
Establishment Clause claim against the government for funding the faith-based
group. See Lown, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 255.
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Branch license to proselytize, but has immunized groups, funded
through general Executive appropriations, from judicial review
with respect to the Establishment Clause.  The Court has also given
the Executive branch license to use religion to denounce whom-
ever it pleases, including but not limited to homosexuals.  The de-
cision has truly brought God back into the White House.

